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I. INTRODUCTION
Everyone has heard something about the Brock Turner case—virtually every
news source has covered it, and new articles are still published each day.1
However, how much of that information is accurate? Do these articles give
readers the full story? Unfortunately, these articles often mislead readers by
providing facts out of context and misrepresenting legal issues.2 For example,
much, if not most, of the information online on People v. Turner3 refers to the
defendant as a “rapist,”4 when in fact he was convicted of sexual assault—not
rape.5 Further, articles often overemphasize Turner’s privileged background,6
ignoring legally relevant mitigating factors like his level of intoxication and

1. See, e.g., KRON Staff Reports, How Brock Turner’s Case Sparked Nationwide Outrage, WISHTV.COM
(Dec. 28, 2016, 2:19 PM), http://wishtv.com/2016/12/28/how-brock-turners-case-sparked-nationwide-outrage/
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (providing an example of an article about the case);
Scott Herhold, Top 10 2016 Stories: Ghost Ship, Brock Turner, Loma Fire, and Others, MERCURY NEWS (Dec.
27, 2016, 12:33 PM), http://www.mercurynews.com/2016/12/27/the-top-ten-stories-of-2016/ (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review) (same); Shenequa Golding, Brock Turner, David Becker and the Other
Deplorables of 2016, VIBE (Dec. 16, 2016, 11:33 AM), http://www.vibe.com/2016/12/ brock-turner-rapeculture/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (same).
2. Infra Parts II–V (describing how this issue pervades California’s criminal justice system).
3. People v. Turner, No. B1577162 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2016).
4. See, e.g., Kory Grow, Stanford Rapist Brock Turner Registers as Sex Offender, ROLLING STONE (Sept.
6, 2016), http://www.rollingstone.com/culture/news/stanford-rapist-brock-turner-registers-as-sex-offenderw438111 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (titled “Stanford Rapist Brock Turner
Registers as Sex Offender”); Sarah Volpenhein, Brock Turner Will Serve the Rest of His Rape Sentence in This
Unsuspecting Town, DAILY BEAST (Sept. 1, 2016), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/09/02/brockturner-will-serve-the-rest-of-his-rape-sentence-in-this-unsuspecting-town.html (on file with The University of
the Pacific Law Review) (titled “Brock Turner Will Serve the Rest of His Rape Sentence in This Unsuspecting
Town” and referring to Turner as “[o]ne of America’s most famous rapists”).
5. Jacqueline Lee, Stanford Sex Case: Brock Turner Found Guilty of Assault on Unconscious Woman,
MERCURY NEWS (Mar. 30, 2016, 10:46 AM), http://www.mercurynews.com/2016/03/30/stanford-sex-casebrock-turner-found-guilty-of-assault-on-unconscious-woman/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review).
6. See, e.g., Zeba Blay, Let’s Not Ignore the Importance of Brock Turner’s Whiteness, HUFFINGTON POST
(June 7, 2016, 4:14 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/lets-not-ignore-the-importance-of-brockturnerswhiteness_us_5756d791e4b0b60682dee518 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review)
(arguing that Turner received only a six month sentence because he is white and was a college athlete).
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absence of a criminal history.7 Perhaps the fact most often overlooked by the
media is that the victim specifically told Turner’s probation officer that she
“do[esn’t] want [Turner] to rot away in jail” and believes he “doesn’t need to be
behind bars.”8 Ultimately, Santa Clara Superior Court Judge Aaron Persky
sentenced Turner to six months in jail, a lawful sentence based in part on the
recommendations of Turner’s probation officer.9 In December 2016, the
California Commission on Judicial Performance officially announced that the
sentence was “within the parameters set by law and . . . within the judge’s
discretion.”10 Despite the lawfulness of the sentence, People v. Turner sparked a
recall campaign11 to take Judge Persky off the bench and inspired two pieces of
legislation in direct response to public outrage over the case.12 The first new law,
Chapter 848, expands the definition of rape to include all forms of nonconsensual
sexual assault—if Turner had been charged under this law, he would have been
convicted of rape.13 The second, Chapter 863, prohibits a judge from granting
probation or lowering a sentence if an individual is convicted of certain types of
sexual assault, including those Turner committed.14 Taken together, these
provisions effectively provide a three year mandatory minimum sentence for all
offenders convicted of nonconsensual sexual assault.15 Governor Jerry Brown
signed both bills into law less than four months after Judge Persky handed down
Turner’s sentence.16 Governor Brown did so despite his recent statement in

7. Probation Report at 11–12, People v. Turner, No. B1577162 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2016), available at
https://assets.document cloud.org/documents/2858997/Probation-officer-s-report-in-Brock-Turner-case.pdf (on
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
8. Id. at 5. In her later statement at Turner’s sentencing, the victim claimed that these statements were
taken out of context and that Turner had changed his story throughout the trial. However, it remains to be
shown what context her statements were removed from, and Turner arguably only added details to his side of
the story that did not actually change the facts. Comparing Turner’s first statement to the police the night of the
incident with what he told his probation officer shows that the two are compatible. Police Report at 27, People
v. Turner, No. B1577162 (filed Jan. 28, 2015), available at https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/
1532973/complaint-brock-turner.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (providing his
initial statement to the police); Probation Report at 6, People v. Turner, No. B1577162 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2016),
available at https://assets.documentcloud. org/documents/2858997/Probation-officer-s-report-in-Brock-Turnercase.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (showing what Turner ultimately said to his
probation officer).
9. Veronica Rocha, Judicial Panel Clears California Judge Who Gave Lenient Sentence in Stanford
Sexual Assault, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2016, 4:00 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-judgeaaron-persky-no-judicial-misconduct-20161219-story.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review).
10. Id.
11. Recall Judge Aaron Persky, RECALL AARON PERSKY, http://www.recallaaronpersky.com/ (last visited
Dec. 23, 2016) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
12. CAL. PENAL CODE § 263.1 (enacted by 2016 Cal. Stat. Ch. 848), 1203.065 (amended by 2016 Cal.
Stat. Ch. 863).
13. Id. § 263.1 (enacted by 2016 Cal. Stat. Ch. 848).
14. Id. § 1203.065 (amended by 2016 Cal. Stat. Ch. 863).
15. Id. § 263.1 (enacted by 2016 Cal. Stat. Ch. 848), 1203.065 (amended by 2016 Cal. Stat. Ch. 863).
16. Daniel Kreps, California Governor Signs Law Enforcing Mandatory Prison for Sexual Assaults,
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response to legislators’ attempts to establish mandatory minimum sentences for
certain other offenses: in vetoing those bills, Governor Brown wrote, “[b]efore
we keep going down this road, I think we should pause and reflect on how our
system of criminal justice could be made more human, more just and more costeffective.”17
Given the prevalence of the substantial inaccuracies in many people’s
understandings of People v. Turner, many of them do not have all the important
facts and lack an understanding of the legal nuances surrounding the decision
when they demand Judge Persky’s recall or support reactive legislation like
Chapters 848 and 863.18 Yet, as California’s criminal justice system is currently
structured, public sentiment—even if misinformed—can have dramatic effects on
the legislature and the judiciary.19 While the government should be responsive to
the public, some amount of insulation from political pressure is necessary to
protect the integrity of the criminal justice system and ensure that individuals are
not punished more harshly than they deserve because of inaccuracies in media
hype.20 Even beyond injustice to individual offenders, California’s decades of
reactive legislation have led to severe prison overcrowding, to the point that the
state is under a federal court order to reduce its prison population.21
The Model Penal Code (“MPC”) is a nonbinding criminal code promulgated
by the American Law Institute (“ALI”), a group of legal scholars including law
professors, judges, and practicing attorneys.22 States may choose to model their
laws after the MPC, or adopt it verbatim.23 The MPC covers substantive criminal
law, and defines specific offenses including their sentencing.24 Each MPC draft
goes through substantial revisions and discussions among ALI members,
resulting in a well-balanced document with clearly explained justifications for

ROLLING STONE (Sept. 30, 2016), http://www.rollingstone.com/culture/news/california-passes-law-enforcingmandatory-prison-for-sexual-assaults-w442950 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
17. Letter from Edmund. G. Brown, Jr., Governor, to the Members of the Cal. State Assembly (Oct. 3,
2015) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
18. Supra Part I (describing the misleading articles that provide many people with information on the
case).
19. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, GORDON HAWKINS & SAM KAMIN, PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY: THREE
STRIKES AND YOU’RE OUT IN CALIFORNIA 177–80, 182–87 (2001).
20. Id. at 182–87; see also KATE BERRY, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, HOW JUDICIAL ELECTIONS
IMPACT CRIMINAL CASES 3 (2015), available at https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/
publications/How_Judicial_Elections_Impact_Criminal_Cases.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific
Law Review) (describing how state judges running for election or retention are often targeted by opponents for
being “soft on crime”).
21. Coleman v. Brown, No. 2:90-cv-0520 LKK DAD (PC), 2014 WL 2889598 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2014),
available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/News/docs/3jp-Feb-2014/Three-Judge-Court-opinion-2-20-2014.pdf (on
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011).
22. JOSHUA DRESSLER, CRIMINAL LAW 30–31 (6th ed. 2012).
23. Id.
24. Id.
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each provision.25 Former Judge Richard Posner of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit referred to the ALI’s deliberation process as a
“model of legal reform—the joint, exhaustive deliberation of lawyers, judges,
and law professors meeting as it were on neutral ground.”26 The ALI’s neutrality
ensures that the MPC provisions are tied to philosophical justifications, not
enacted in response to political issues.27
In May 2017, the ALI published a revised version of the MPC Sentencing
(“MPCS”) provisions.28 Described in more detail below,29 these revisions
establish a sentencing commission to promulgate guidelines for sentencing
judges to follow, including factors for judges to consider like individual offender
characteristics.30 The ALI’s promulgation of new MPC provisions is an ideal
time for state legislatures to adopt those parts of the Code.31 Since California
needs a solution to the issues pervading its criminal justice system,32 the state
should adopt the 2017 Model Penal Code Sentencing revisions to address those
issues.33 The legislature’s political games have gotten California to the place
where it is today, and it needs the MPC to get it out.34 “[T]he dynamics of local
criminal law politics make it very difficult, if not impossible, to achieve general
criminal law recodification without the kind of outside help provided by the
Model Penal Code.”35 There is no time like the present for California to finally
do so.36
II. CALIFORNIA’S CURRENT SENTENCING SYSTEM
This section will give a brief history of how California arrived at its current
sentencing system, including the state’s philosophical choice towards a
retributive focus in the 1970s and how that has, in part, led to its current
dysfunctional system.37

25. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING xiii (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 4 2016)
[hereinafter “MPCS”] (“This project has been previously discussed at nine Annual meetings.”).
26. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 303 (2002).
27. See id. (commending the ALI’s neutrality).
28. MPCS, supra note 25, at xiii.
29. Infra Part IV (detailing the proposed MPCS revisions).
30. MPCS, supra note 25, § 6B.06(4)(a).
31. Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, Can a Model Penal Code Second Save the States from
Themselves?, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 169, 177 (2003).
32. Infra Part III (describing current issues with California’s criminal justice system).
33. Infra Part IV (proposing that the MPCS revisions could help alleviate California’s current issues in its
criminal justice system).
34. Infra Part II (detailing the politics that in part created problematic legislation in California).
35. Robinson & Cahill, supra note 31, at 173.
36. Infra Parts II–IV (analyzing why California needs the MPCS revisions).
37. Infra Parts II.A–D (laying out California’s current sentencing system and some of its history).
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A. The Move from Indeterminate to Determinate Sentencing
Before the 1970s, most states, including California, utilized an indeterminate
sentencing system.38 These systems held rehabilitation as their primary purpose
of punishment.39 The length of an offender’s incarceration would not be
determined on the day of sentencing based on the offense committed, but rather
would be set for an indefinite duration and revisited after some time to measure
whether the offender showed signs of rehabilitation.40 Whether the offender
successfully responded to rehabilitation was a determination not for the judge to
make in advance on the day of sentencing, but for a correctional officer or parole
board familiar with the individual’s behavior in jail.41
Although some amount of judicial discretion is essential to a properly
functioning criminal justice system, this indeterminate sentencing system
ultimately leaves too much room for interpretation both with judges at sentencing
and with correctional authorities in determining prisoner release dates.42 A
further criticism of this purely rehabilitative model is that it could lead to
disproportionate sentences, with some too severe and others too lenient.43 For
example, a person could end up in prison for an extended period of time for a
minor crime if the prison authorities did not believe he had responded to
rehabilitation, while another person convicted of murder could show signs of
rehabilitation sufficient to warrant early release far sooner than would be
considered appropriate for such a crime.44 This wide disparity, led states to
abandon the indeterminate sentencing model during the 1970s.45
These states, including California, established a determinate sentencing
structure instead and refocused criminal punishment on retribution, rather than
rehabilitation.46 Whereas the indeterminate sentencing system focused on the
offender and his individual ability to be rehabilitated and reintegrated into
society, the new determinate sentencing system focused on the offense itself and
took far fewer of the defendant’s personal characteristics into account.47 In 1976,
Governor Jerry Brown, then in his first term in office, signed Senate Bill 42 into

38. Michael Vitiello & Clark Kelso, A Proposal for a Wholesale Reform of California’s Sentencing
Practice and Policy, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 903, 918 (2004); Sheldon L. Messinger & Phillip E. Johnson,
California’s Determinate Sentencing Statute: History and Issues, 1 DETERMINATE SENTENCING: REFORM OR
REGRESSION 13, 15 (1978) (noting that California first introduced indeterminate sentencing in 1917).
39. Vitiello & Kelso, supra note 38, at 918.
40. Id.; DRESSLER, supra note 22, at 24.
41. DRESSLER, supra note 22, at 24.
42. Vitiello & Kelso, supra note 38, at 919.
43. Id. at 918–19.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 919.
46. Id.
47. Id.; Messinger & Johnson, supra note 38, at 13–14.
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law, thus redirecting California’s criminal justice system.48 That bill added
section 1170(a)(1) to the California Penal Code, which has since stated its
retributive purpose: “The Legislature finds and declares that the purpose of
imprisonment for crime is punishment.”49 This first sentence of the statute clearly
responded to the dissatisfaction with the rehabilitative focus by reinstating
retribution as the primary goal of California’s system.50 The statute also
responded to the disparity of sentencing among individuals that committed the
same offense:51 “This purpose is best served by terms . . . with provision for
uniformity in the sentences of offenders committing the same offense under
similar circumstances.”52
California’s determinate sentencing law did not take away all discretion from
the sentencing judge, but left some—at least in the law’s original 1976 form.53 It
established maximum, middle, and minimum presumptive terms of imprisonment
for individual crimes, and allowed the court to deviate from the middle sentence
if it found aggravating or mitigating factors supporting that decision.54 In its
original form, the statute required that “the court . . . order imposition of the
middle term, unless there are circumstances in aggravation or mitigation of the
crime,” circumstances found by the court and not the jury.55 Although these
three sentences were based on the average time offenders ended up serving for
the same crimes under the indeterminate system, the drafters of the statutes still
“had to make a conscious choice about how to allocate prison terms.”56 In its
current form, the statute vests the decision between the three sentences “within
the sound discretion of the court” without requiring distinct factfinding by the
judge.57
California Rule of Court 4.410 instructs judges to consider multiple
objectives when determining individual sentences.58 All traditional theories of
criminal punishment are present in this statute:59 rehabilitation (“[e]ncouraging
the defendant to lead a law-abiding life in the future”60), retribution (“[p]unishing

48. Messinger & Johnson, supra note 38, at 21.
49. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(a)(1) (West 2017).
50. Id. § 1170(a)(1); Vitiello & Kelso, supra note 38, at 919.
51. Vitiello & Kelso, supra note 38, at 919.
52. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(a)(1) (West 2017).
53. Vitiello & Kelso, supra note 38, at 919.
54. Id. at 920.
55. Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 278 (2007).
56. Vitiello & Kelso, supra note 38, at 920 n.75.
57. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(b) (West 2017). The statute was revised in 2007 to its current form in
response to a Supreme Court decision holding its prior language unconstitutional. The statute previously
allowed the judge to engage in factfinding to decide between the range of sentences, the Court in Cunningham
v. California, found this violative of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. 549 U.S. 270 (2007).
58. CAL. R. CT. 4.410(a).
59. Id.
60. Id. 4.410(a)(3).
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the defendant”61), incapacitation (“[p]reventing the defendant from committing
new crimes by isolating him or her for the period of incarceration”62), and
deterrence (“[d]eterring others from criminal conduct by demonstrating its
consequences”63). Of course, not all theories can be furthered in every case, so
the Rule provides that the judge must decide which is of paramount importance
in each case, and in doing so should be “guided by statutory statements of policy,
the criteria in these rules, and the facts and circumstances of the case.”64
The sentencing provisions of the California Penal Code have not remained as
relatively straightforward as they might have initially been when the state passed
the Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act of 1976.65 Since then, hundreds of often
arbitrary sentence enhancements were enacted, which “eroded whatever
coherence was achieved in 1976.”66 Whatever coherence existed in 1976 was
limited at least in part because the “common ground” for the new system was
merely “opposition to a previous regime.”67 The system “never had articulate
defenders.”68 In 1998, then-state senator Adam Schiff introduced Senate Bill
1794 in an attempt to organize the enhancements that had been “added to the
Penal Code in a haphazard fashion for decades.”69 He stated, “[e]nhancements
are the most abused . . . [and] most complex and chaotic provisions in the Penal
Code.”70 Most of these enhancements were added to the Code during the “tough
on crime” era that peaked during the 1980s and 1990s—in fact, over 1,000 crime
bills passed in the California legislature between 1984 and 1991 alone.71
Governor Brown spoke to this issue in his recent letter cited above: “[t]his
multiplication and particularization of criminal behavior creates increasing
complexity without commensurate benefit.”72

61. Id. 4.410(a)(2).
62. Id. 4.410(a)(5).
63. Id. 4.410(a)(4).
64. Id. 4.410(b).
65. Vitiello & Kelso, supra note 38, at 920.
66. Id. at 919.
67. ZIMRING, HAWKINS & KAMIN, supra note 19, at 215.
68. Id.
69. Should All Sentence Enhancements Be Listed in One Penal Code Section and Be Categorized by
Length of Term for Reference Purposes Only?: Hearing on S.B. 1794 Before the Subcomm. on Public Safety,
1998 Leg., 1997–1998 Sess. 1 (Cal. 1998) (statement of Adam Schiff, Senator) (on file with The University of
the Pacific Law Review).
70. Id.
71. Vitiello & Kelso, supra note 38, at 921.
72. Letter from Edmund. G. Brown, supra note 17.
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B. California Gets “Tough on Crime”
After making the move to determinate sentencing in 1976,73 California
embraced the “tough on crime” era of the 1980s and 1990s with open arms.74
Politicians throughout the country based their campaign platforms on the slogan
and vilified opponents for being “soft on crime.”75 One political-consulting firm
that created mail advertisements for candidates during the 1990s usually printed
at least eight “tough on crime” ads out of every ten general ads for each client.76
In California, then-Governor Pete Wilson based his 1994 re-election campaign
on a “tough on crime” platform, in large part, by vouching his support for the
Three Strikes Law, which was ultimately passed in response to twelve-year-old
Polly Klaas’ kidnapping and murder.77 California’s Three Strikes Law is the
poster child of impulsive “tough on crime” legislation.78 It was enacted when
when “anti-crime sentiment was inflamed” by Polly Klaas’ death and the general
public believed the “misperception that the crime rate was on the rise.”79
Although the “tough on crime” era peaked in the 1990s,80 it remains a
popular slogan among politicians seeking to win elections by promising a heavyhanded approach to crime, and capitalizes on public fears by making examples
out of recent high-profile crimes.81 The “tough on crime” promise also comes
into play in judicial elections.82 While judges are appointed federally and in some
states, many state judges must run for election and periodically hold retention
campaigns as well.83 California is one of those states that requires a judge to be
73. Messinger & Johnson, supra note 38, at 21.
74. Stephen Stock, Michael Bott & Mark Villareal, Enhancements Leave Thousands of California
Inmates with Extraordinarily Long Sentences, NBC (Feb. 26, 2016), http://www.nbcbayarea.com/
investigations/Thousands-of-California-Inmates-Face-Extraordinarily-Long-Sentences-Because-ofEnhancements-370335951.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
75. Paul Waldman, When Everyone Wanted to Be “Tough on Crime”, AM. PROSPECT (Aug. 13, 2013),
http://prospect.org/article/when-everyone-wanted-be-tough-crime (on file with The University of the Pacific
Law Review). See also BERRY, supra note 20 (describing how state judges running for election or retention are
often targeted by opponents for being “soft on crime”).
76. Waldman, supra note 75.
77. ZIMRING, HAWKINS & KAMIN, supra note 19, at 6–8; see infra Part III.A.1 (describing the impetus for
Three Strikes).
78. ZIMRING, HAWKINS & KAMIN, supra note 19, at 3–5.
79. Vitiello & Kelso, supra note 38, at 931.
80. Arit John, A Timeline of the Rise and Fall of ‘Tough on Crime’ Drug Sentencing, ATLANTIC (Apr. 22,
2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/04/a-timeline-of-the-rise-and-fall-of-tough-on-crimedrug-sentencing/360983/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
81. BERRY, supra note 20; see, e.g., Jon Swaine, Law Enforcement Officials Warn Against Trump’s
‘Tough on Crime’ Policy, GUARDIAN (July 13, 2016, 12:35 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2016/jul/13/donald-trump-crime-policy-law-enforcement-officials-letter (on file with The University of
the Pacific Law Review) (describing how Republican candidate Donald Trump emphasized his “tough on
crime” approach to criminal justice and labeled himself the “law and order candidate” during the 2016
Presidential election).
82. BERRY, supra note 20, at 5–6.
83. AM. BAR ASS’N, FACT SHEET ON JUDICIAL SELECTION METHODS IN THE STATES 1, available at
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elected by voters.84 Not only do these judges running for election often utilize a
“tough on crime” platform, but a recent study done by the Brennan Center for
Justice at the New York University School of Law shows that judges tend to
hand down harsher sentences, and are more likely to uphold death penalty
convictions on appeal when they have retention elections approaching.85
Explained more fully below, the “tough on crime” mentality threatens judicial
impartiality because it pervades and skews a neutral justice system in both the
legislative and judicial branches.86
Beyond its adverse effects on individual offenders, California’s “tough on
crime” legislation has created systematically excessive sentences that have led to
severe overcrowding in prisons.87 At a certain point, these long sentences are
unjustified, unnecessary for public protection, and only serve to drain the state’s
resources, no longer furthering any punishment purpose.88 In 1980, California
had 23,264 individuals in prison.89 As the “tough on crime” era gained traction
and California piled on its reactive legislation, the prison population increased to
a high of 173,942 individuals in 2006,90 and remains around 130,000 at the start
of 2017—a little over 133% of capacity.91 In 2009, a three-judge panel of the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of California held that the
medical services in the state’s prisons were so inadequate due to overcrowding
that they violated prisoners’ Eighth Amendment rights.92 The panel ordered
California to reduce its prison population to 137.5% of design capacity—
effectively ordering the release of 33,000 prisoners.93 The Supreme Court upheld
this order: “[t]he overcrowding is the primary cause of the violation of a Federal
right, specifically the severe and unlawful mistreatment of prisoners through
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/leadership/fact_sheet.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited
Dec. 29, 2016) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
84. Id.
85. BERRY, supra note 20, at 7–11.
86. Infra Part III.B (detailing California’s threats to judicial impartiality).
87. California Radically Revamping Prison System, S.F. CHRON. (Mar. 15, 2016, 11:35 AM),
http://www.sfchronicle.com/opinion/editorials/article/California-radically-revamping-prison-system6885920.php (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
88. Michael Vitiello, Three Strikes: Can We Return to Rationality?, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 395,
437–40 (1997) [hereinafter “Vitiello Three Strikes”].
89. State-By-State Data, SENT’G PROJECT, http://www.sentencingproject.org/thefacts/#detail?state1
Option=California&state2Option=0 (last visited Jan. 20, 2017) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review).
90. Id.
91. CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., WEEKLY REPORT OF POPULATION AS OF MIDNIGHT JANUARY 18,
2017 (2017), available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/Offender_ Information_Services_Branch/
WeeklyWed/TPOP1A/TPOP1Ad170118.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
92. CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., THREE-JUDGE PANEL AND CALIFORNIA INMATE POPULATION
REDUCTION 2 (2011), available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/News/docs/2011-05-23-Three-Judge-PanelBackground.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
93. Id.
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grossly inadequate provision of medical and mental health care.”94
C. California and Sentencing Commissions
A sentencing commission is an organization with delegated administrative or
judicial authority to promulgate sentencing guidelines.95 It consists of legal
experts who set sentencing guidelines for specific crimes, with a certain window
of discretion for judges to vary sentences for individual defendants.96 There are
several benefits to a well-structured sentencing commission.97 First, it serves to
insulate sentencing laws and decisions from the public’s reactions to highly
publicized crime, as well as from political pressure in the legislature.98 Second, it
decreases direct accountability for judges to the constituency, which is
particularly important in a state like California where judges face periodic
elections.99 If judges have a specified amount of discretion within reasonable
guidelines set by a sentencing commission, public backlash against a judge for a
sentencing decision within those guidelines would be sorely misplaced and
fruitless.100
California currently has no sentencing commission.101 State lawmakers have
made at least nine attempts to establish one since the state moved to determinate
sentencing in 1976, yet all of those attempts have failed.102 According to one
commentator, these repeated failures are due at least in part to the perception that
sentencing commissions are “nefarious attempts on the part of prison
abolitionists to release dangerous criminals from prison.”103 This is a typical
sentiment of the “tough on crime” mindset that currently plagues California’s
criminal justice system.104 This Comment proposes in more detail below that the
sentencing commission provisions of the 2017 Model Penal Code Sentencing
revisions would serve as a perfect foundation for California to finally foray into
the world of sentencing commissions—a change it so desperately needs.105

94. Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 502 (2011) (internal citations omitted).
95. ZIMRING, HAWKINS & KAMIN, supra note 19, at 212–13.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 184.
99. Id.
100. See id. at 215 (“New institutions like the sentencing commission are one part of the answer;
restoring faith in the authority and expertise of sentencing judges is another.”).
101. Kara Dansky, A Blueprint for a California Sentencing Commission, 22 FED. SENT’G. REP. 158, 158
(2010).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Infra Part IV (applying the MPCS revisions to California’s problems).
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D. How Sentence Enhancements Are Added to California’s Penal Code
Most legislation, including sentencing enhancements, can either be added to
California’s law through the initiative process or through the legislature.106
Provided that certain procedural requirements are met, the initiative process
allows any person in California to propose legislation.107 An online guide
published by the Secretary of State details the required format for initiatives.108
The basic requirements are that proposed statutes gather 365,880 signatures, and
constitutional amendments 585,407 signatures.109 The Secretary of State validates
the signatures, and if the number is at least 110% of the required amount, the
measure is qualified to be on the ballot in the next statewide election.110
California initiatives appear on the ballot as “yes-or-no” options.111 In reality,
initiatives are often funded by special interest groups that capitalize on public
sentiment and “push the terms of a proposition beyond” what voters would
actually prefer, assuming the constituency would prefer this more extreme
version to the alternative of no change at all.112 The initiative process is
responsible for some of the “crime of the month” sentence enhancements.113
Alternatively, statutes can be added to the books through the legislative
process, which is more conducive to properly nuanced legal provisions than the
simple “yes-or-no” ballot initiatives.114 Ideally, the laws produced through this
method are the product of legislative compromise inherent in the system,
including contributions from legal experts and scholars in the field.115 However,
some of California’s sentence enhancements, notably the Three Strikes Law
passed in 1994, were enacted through the legislative process with little to no
input from these experts.116 Instead, these statutes were the result of political
pressure, often enacted in response to public reaction to highly publicized
crime—even when existing law was already sufficient to address the offense.117
With this setup, California’s sentencing laws are subject to public whim, who

106. ZIMRING, HAWKINS & KAMIN, supra note 19, at 192–93.
107. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, 2017 STATEWIDE INITIATIVE GUIDE, available at http://elections.cdn.sos.ca.
gov/ballot-measures/pdf/statewide-initiative-guide.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 5.
110. Id. at 11.
111. ZIMRING, HAWKINS & KAMIN, supra note 19, at 192–93.
112. Id.; Michael Vitiello, Proposition 215: De Facto Legalization of Pot and the Shortcomings of Direct
Democracy, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 707, 736 (1998) [hereinafter “Vitiello Proposition 215”].
113. ZIMRING, HAWKINS & KAMIN, supra note 19, at 192-93.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 3, 192-93; Vitiello Proposition 215, supra note 112, at 729.
116. ZIMRING, HAWKINS & KAMIN, supra note 19, at 3.
117. Vitiello & Kelso, supra note 38, at 921; ZIMRING, HAWKINS & KAMIN, supra note 19, at 192–93.
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generally do not understand the intricacies of the law.118 The politicians
advocating for new sentence enhancements “bear few costs from enacting or
developing poorly organized and drafted criminal codes,” and the voting public
would be aware of the underlying issues of such legislation “only if it understood
the inner workings of the criminal justice system in a way that typically only
judges, lawyers, and other frequent participants do.”119 As developed in the
following section, excessive sentence enhancements are the result of the
confluence of California’s non-insulated legislative system and the “tough on
crime” mentality of the era.120 Establishing a sentencing commission would
provide a more insulated system and better protect the integrity of California’s
criminal justice system—where the voice of the people is still heard, but through
the filter of a politically neutral, expert sentencing commission.121
E. California’s State Judges
Not only is California’s legislative process conducive to precipitous laws, but
the state’s judicial branch is vulnerable to politics as well.122 The majority of
California state judges are elected and must periodically run for retention, which
in and of itself subjects them to the political system.123 Electing judges is not
unique to California.124 What is unique to California, however, is how relatively
easy it is for the public to initiate a recall election and remove a judge from the
bench for virtually any reason.125 Recall is an option in many states for the
constituency to remove elected government officials from office before their
natural terms are up.126 It is most commonly used against local public officials,

118. ZIMRING, HAWKINS & KAMIN, supra note 19, at 182–87; Paul H. Robinson, Michael T. Cahill &
Usman Mohammad, The Five Worst (and Five Best) American Criminal Codes, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 2 (2000).
119. Robinson, Cahill & Mohammad, supra note 118, at 2.
120. Infra part I.C.1 (discussing the Three Strikes and 10-20-Life laws as examples of California’s “tough
on crime” reactive legislation).
121. ZIMRING, HAWKINS & KAMIN, supra note 19, at 182–87.
122. Tracey L. Meares, If You Want Independent Judges, Don’t Elect Them, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2016/06/08/should-an-unpopular-sentence-in-the-stanford-rape-casecost-a-judge-his-job/if-you-want-independent-judges-dont-elect-them (on file with The University of the Pacific
Law Review).
123. Judicial Selection in the States: California, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS., http://www.judicial
selection.us/judicial_selection/index.cfm?state=CA (last visited Dec. 29, 2016) (on file with The University of
the Pacific Law Review).
124. AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 83.
125. Procedure for Recalling State and Local Officials, CAL. SECRETARY ST., http://www.sos.ca.gov/
elections/recalls/procedure-recalling-state-and-local-officials/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2016) (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review).
126. Recall of Local Officials, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/ research/electionsand-campaigns/recall-of-local-officials.aspx (last visited Jan. 2, 2017) (on file with The University of the Pacific
Law Review).
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often at the school board or city council level.127 Although judges are elected to
the bench in many states, only a few of these states allow for their recall.128
While other states will review the merits of the recall petition, California’s
constitution prohibits this—the proponents of the recall need only provide a 200word statement of the reasons for the recall, but “the sufficiency of this reason is
not reviewable.”129 In contrast, other states evaluate the merits of recall
petitions.130 Essentially, California judicial recall petitions need only meet
formatting requirements and the gathering of enough votes, specifically the
equivalent of 20% of the last vote for the office if the petition seeks to recall the
judge of a superior court or the Justice of a Court of Appeal, and the recall will
be on the ballot in the next statewide election.131 The people’s vote on the recall
is the final say in whether the judge will be removed from the bench.132
III. ISN’T MOB RULE A THING OF THE PAST? IN CALIFORNIA, NOT REALLY
A basic tenet of every self-help article is that heightened emotions cloud
rational decision-making.133 It should follow, then, that if it is not ideal for one
individual to make personal decisions while upset, the entire voting body of a
state should not make far-reaching legal decisions in the wake of and in reaction
to a highly publicized, particularly tragic crime.134 People understandably want to
see justice served when their communities are struck by a tragic crime.135 It is
human nature to “exaggerate the seriousness of an offense that affects one
personally,” so when crime strikes close to home, people are more likely to
overreact and seek vindication through the legislature.136 However, the
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id.
Id.
Procedure for Recalling State and Local Officials, supra note 125.
Eli Hager, How Easy Would It Be to Recall the Judge in the Brock Turner Case?, MARSHALL
PROJECT (June 7, 2016), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2016/06/07/how-easy-would-it-be-to-recall-thejudge-in-the-brock-turner-case#.9EHGmBdkt (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
131. Procedure for Recalling State and Local Officials, supra note 125.
132. Id.
133. See, e.g., Katie, Why You Shouldn’t Make Decisions When You’re Emotional, RESILIENT (July 5,
2016), http://resilientapp.com/growth/shouldnt-make-decisions-youre-emotional/ (on file with The University of
the Pacific Law Review) (arguing that “sharp emotion in the heat of the moment” can “cloud[] your judgment”);
Jennifer S. Lerner & Katherine Shonk, How Anger Poisons Decision Making, HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept. 2010),
https://hbr.org/2010/09/how-anger-poisons-decision-making (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review) (describing studies where participants were more punitive towards fictional tort defendants after seeing
an “anger-inducing video” than participants who viewed a neutral video).
134. Katie, supra note 133; Lerner & Shonk, supra note 133.
135. Franklin E. Zimring, Populism, Democratic Government, and the Decline of Expert Authority: Some
Reflections on “Three Strikes” in California, 28 U. PAC. L. REV. 243, 256 (1996) (warning of the dangers of
“direct sentimental governance” like California’s Three Strikes Law and advocating for a “culture of
responsibility as a defense against the next panic.”).
136. Robinson & Cahill, supra note 31, at 171.
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appropriate solution is not to enact unnecessary laws targeted at the specific
crime, when existing law is already sufficient to punish the wrongful conduct.137
Nor is the solution to demand recall of a judge who imposes a sentence the public
happens to find problematic, when that sentence was entirely lawful and within
the judge’s authority.138 These two behaviors erode the integrity of the criminal
justice system, and they run rampant in California’s current structure.139 In the
following two sections, this Comment will address the issues with precipitous
legislation and judicial recall in turn.140
A. Reactive Legislation Might Feel Good in the Moment, But It Does Not Feel
Good for the Criminal Justice System
As discussed above, there are several issues with reactive legislation,
especially in California: it is not conducive to producing well-nuanced law, and it
has overcomplicated our state’s penal code by piling up unnecessary
“barnacles”141 of sentence enhancements that were enacted in response to the
public outcry over the “crime of the month.”142 Aside from these threats to the
integrity of the criminal justice system, reactive legislation generally proves to be
ultimately unjustifiable in light of its practical costs on society.143 This section
will cover a few examples of such legislation in California and detail the issues
with each provision: the Three Strikes Law; 10-20-Life; and Chapters 848 and
863, the recent laws enacted in response to public dissatisfaction with the
sentence in People v. Turner.144
1. Three Strikes
On October 1, 1993, twelve-year-old Polly Klaas was kidnapped at
knifepoint from her Petaluma home while she was having a slumber party with
two of her friends.145 Polly was missing for over two months.146 FBI detectives
traced the crime to Richard Allen Davis, who ultimately confessed and led them
to the location in the woods where he buried her.147 Polly’s tragic death inspired

137. Vitiello & Kelso, supra note 38, at 921–25.
138. Hager, supra note 130.
139. Infra Parts III.A–B (describing those two issues).
140. Infra Parts IIIA–B (describing those two issues).
141. Robinson & Cahill, supra note 31, at 172.
142. Supra Part II.C (describing the initiative process).
143. Vitiello & Kelso, supra note 38, at 959 n. 305.
144. Infra Parts IIIA.1–3 (detailing those laws).
145. A 12-Year-Old Girl is Kidnapped, HISTORY.COM, http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/a-12year-old-girl-is-kidnapped (last visited Feb. 6, 2017) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
146. Id.
147. Id.
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public outrage in its own right.148 However, what provided the momentum for the
passage of the Three Strikes initiative into law one year later was Davis’ prior
convictions.149 Before he kidnapped Polly, Davis had previously been convicted
of burglary, kidnapping, and assault, and was sentenced to sixteen years in prison
but released early on parole.150 Polly’s father initially lobbied for Three Strikes as
a legislative response to his daughter’s death, but ultimately distanced himself
from it upon realizing issues with the bill’s drafting—although he eventually
returned to lobbying for “tough on crime” legislation.151 Even so, over 70% of
California voted the Three Strikes initiative into law in November 1994.152
Three Strikes is a repeat-offender statute,153 giving second-time offenders
increased sentences and third-time offenders life imprisonment, if the third
offense is an enumerated violent felony.154 In its original form, the third strike
25-years-to-life term would have activated at any felony, be it a marijuana
possession charge or murder.155 However, California voters opted to lessen the
extremity of the provision in 2012 when they approved Proposition 36.156 Now,
the third strike must be one of the “violent” felonies enumerated in section 667.5
of the California Penal Code.157 Despite this change, however, Three Strikes
remains ultimately unjustifiable and draining on the state’s resources, even in the
face of an order from the United States Supreme Court itself that the state reduce
its prison population.158
In adopting the Three Strikes law, the California legislature shifted its
primary goal in punishing recidivists from the retribution embodied in the 1976
Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act to deterrence and incapacitation, goals that
necessitate longer sentences.159 Because Three Strikes focuses entirely on the
offense and turns a blind eye to the offender, it leaves no room for considerations

148.
149.
150.
151.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.; see Marc Klaas, Prop. 57 Would Release Violent Criminals and Undermine Victims’ Rights,
SACRAMENTO BEE (Oct. 24, 2016, 3:00 PM), http://www.sacbee.com/opinion/op-ed/soapbox/article
110211372.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (arguing against Proposition 57, which
voters ultimately did pass in the November 2016 election and provides for increased parole opportunities for
inmates).
152. California Proposition 184, The Three Strikes Initiative (1994), BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.
org/California_Proposition_184,_the_Three_Strikes_Initiative_(1994) (last visited Feb. 6, 2017) (on file with
The University of the Pacific Law Review).
153. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (West 2017).
154. Id. § 667.5.
155. ZIMRING, HAWKINS & KAMIN, supra note 19, at 8 Table 1.1.
156. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.5 (amended by 2012 Cal. Stat. Ch. 43).
157. Id.
158. Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011).
159. Michael Vitiello, California’s Three Strikes and We’re Out: Was Judicial Activism California’s Best
Hope?, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1025, 1066 (2004) [hereinafter “Vitiello Judicial Activism”].
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of rehabilitation.160 Further, a purely retributive punishment would only punish
the offender for the current crime, rather than considering recidivism in
determining the deserved punishment.161 The law merits a much deeper
discussion than what is to follow here, but at root, it is ultimately unjustified by
either deterrence or incapacitation.162 Three Strikes “provides marginal
deterrence at best,”163 and any evidence of that marginal result is “weak.”164 As
for incapacitation, it is only a supported justification so long as the offender
poses an actual threat to society.165 Many third strike offenders serve more time
than is necessary for adequate rehabilitation.166 With such long sentences, many
of these offenders will ultimately join the geriatric prison population, which costs
about three times as much to incarcerate as younger inmates.167 Not only is this
unfair for the offenders themselves, but it is incredibly draining on California’s
resources.168
Despite the lack of clarity surrounding Three Strikes’ penological purpose,
especially in light of the excessively long punishments it creates, California
appellate courts have not paid much heed to challenges to the law.169
Unfortunately, the main reason behind the courts’ blind eye is the same
phenomenon that gave us this flawed provision in the first place: its
“overwhelming voter support.”170 Rather than critically examining Three Strikes
sentences, the California courts of appeal have taken a result-oriented approach,
either consciously or subconsciously, and have deferred to public sentiment
surrounding the law.171 Three Strikes was enacted in response to highly
publicized crime, and it likely “would not have passed but for the kidnapping and
murder of Polly Klaas.”172 Now, California is stuck in a stalemate with an
excessively punitive law, largely unjustified by any theory of punishment, that its
own courts will not examine with a critical eye because of the same public
sentiment that passed the reactive law in the first instance.173

160. JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE VOLUME 2: ADJUDICATION 349
(4th ed. 2006); Vitiello Judicial Activism, supra note 159, at 1066.
161. DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 160, at 346.
162. Vitiello Judicial Activism, supra note 159, at 1070.
163. Id.
164. ZIMRING, HAWKINS & KAMIN, supra note 19, at 105.
165. DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 160, at 348–49.
166. Vitiello Judicial Activism, supra note 159, at 1069–70.
167. Vitiello Three Strikes, supra note 88, at 437–40.
168. Id.
169. Vitiello Judicial Activism, supra note 159, at 1070.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1071.
173. Id. at 1070–71.
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2. 10-20-Life
10-20-Life is a sentence enhancement activated if the defendant used a gun
during the commission of certain crimes.174 Although not enacted in response to a
particular instance of crime, it was part of the general “tough on crime”
movement and was passed on the momentum of the Three Strikes Law.175 Also
known as the “Use a Gun and You’re Done” law, this provision was passed in the
Legislature in 1997.176 The law was the product of the “tough on crime”
sentiment, as embodied by statements by its author to the Assembly Committee
on Public Safety: “[f]or far too long, criminals have been using guns to prey on
their victims. [This law] will keep these parasites where they belong . . . in
jail . . . [W]e are sending . . . [a] clear message: [i]f you use a gun to commit a
crime, you’re going to jail, and you’re staying there.”177
The law adds a mandatory sentence enhancement depending on how the
offender utilized a gun during commission of a crime.178 Depending on whether
the defendant “personally use[d] a firearm,” “personally and intentionally
discharge[d] a firearm,” or all of the above and “cause[d] great bodily injury . . .
or death,” his sentence will increase by ten years, twenty years, or life
imprisonment, respectively.179 Notably, the 10-20-Life law specifically prevents
judicial discretion in sentencing.180 If the enhancements apply, the sentencing
judge cannot lower them even if the ultimate sentence is disproportionate to the
offender’s actual culpability.181 This law is one of many California’s sentence
enhancements that often results in arbitrary increases in prison terms.182 These
extended sentences are ultimately unjustified for reasons similar to those listed
above regarding Three Strikes.183
3. Chapters 848 and 863
In direct response to public outrage over People v. Turner, Governor Brown
signed into law Chapters 848 and 863—two recent examples of precipitous

174. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022.53 (West 2017).
175. See Vitiello & Kelso, supra note 38, at 921 (discussing the tough on crime era in California during
the 1990s).
176. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022.53 (enacted by 1997 Cal. Stat. Ch. 503).
177. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 4, at 2 (Apr. 15, 1997)
(quoted in Gregory L. Maxim, Moving Beyond Three Strikes Through California’s Firearm Sentencing
Enhancements, 29 U. PAC. L. REV. 531, 534 n.23 (1997)).
178. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022.53 (West 2017).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Stock, Bott & Villareal, supra note 74.
183. Supra Part IIA.1 (discussing why Three Strikes is ultimately unjustifiable).
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legislation.184 Chapter 848 added another section to the California Penal Code,
section 263.1, which provides that “all forms of nonconsensual sexual assault
may be considered rape for purposes of the gravity of the offense and the support
of survivors.”185 At first glance, this may seem like a beneficial provision in that
it gives the sentencing judge more discretion to increase a sexual assault
sentence, if necessary, to match the severity of a rape sentence.186 However,
when considered in light of the issues developed below187 that face judges in a
state like California, where they are not only elected, but face the possibility of
unchecked recall efforts,188 the likelihood appears greater that this provision may
not always be used in the best interests of either society or the victim.189 In the
wake of the public outrage and backlash over People v. Turner, a judge may be
prone to applying this provision to more sexual assault offenders than necessary
for fear of becoming the next Judge Persky.190 Further, the characterization of the
law surrounding People v. Turner and the function of this bill in many articles
was misleading, as is typical of the media’s contribution to reactive legislation.191
Chapter 863 removes a sentencing judge’s discretion, providing that
“probation shall not be granted to, nor shall the execution or imposition of a
sentence be suspended for,” any individual convicted of specified sexual assault
crimes.192 Further, it effectively imposes a three year mandatory minimum
sentence on any offender in conjunction with Chapter 848 described above:
Chapter 848 equates all forms of sexual assault with a conviction of rape, and
Chapter 863 takes away the judge’s discretion to impose probation instead of
imprisonment for rape.193 Certainly, some sexual assault offenders deserve a
three year prison term or longer, but their culpability does not mean that all
individuals in violation of that statute merit the same sentence.194
184. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 263.1 (enacted by 2016 Cal. Stat. Ch. 848), 1203.065 (amended by 2016 Cal.
Stat. Ch. 863); Kreps, supra note 16.
185. CAL. PENAL CODE § 263.1 (enacted by 2016 Cal. Stat. Ch. 848).
186. Id.
187. Infra Part III.B (discussing threats to judicial impartiality in California).
188. Infra Part III.B (discussing threats to judicial impartiality in California).
189. See BERRY, supra note 20, at 7–8 (describing how elected judges tend to sentence more punitively
the closer they get to a retention election).
190. See id. at 3–5 (detailing the pressures judges face in media portrayals of their decisions).
191. See, e.g., Lonni Rivera, Brock Turner Inspires CA Bill That Would Close Loophole on Sex Assault
Cases, ABC 7 NEWS (Sept. 2, 2016), http://abc7news.com/news/brock-turner-inspires-ca-bill-that-would-closeloophole-on-sex-assault-cases/1496715/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (referring to
existing law before the bill as providing a “loophole” for sexual assault offenders); Sonam Sheth, California
Bill Closes Major Sexual-Assault Loophole Days Before Brock Turner’s Release, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 31, 2016,
2:04 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/california-bill-closes-major-sexual-assault-loophole-before-brockturners-release-2016-8 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (same).
192. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.065 (amended by 2016 Cal. Stat. ch. 863).
193. Id. §§ 263.1 (enacted by 2016 Cal. Stat. ch. 848), 1203.065 (amended by 2016 Cal. Stat. ch. 863);
see also id. § 264(a) (providing that the minimum sentence for a rape conviction is three years imprisonment).
194. See ZIMRING, HAWKINS & KAMIN, supra note 19, at 195 (discussing the unfair sentences that result
from basing legislation off of the “worst case scenario” crime).
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Even if reforms did need to be made to California’s sexual assault laws, this
was not the way to do it—basing legislation off of the “worst case scenario,” the
“crime of the month” that sparked public outrage calling for new laws, ensures
bad policy and overly punitive statutes.195 It almost inevitably leads to the
imposition of longer sentences than is necessary for many offenders who did not
commit the equivalent of the “worst case scenario” crime that set the bar for
punishment.196
B. Judges Cannot be Impartial Arbiters of the Law When Their Job Security
Depends on Public Satisfaction
The judicial branch of any American government, state or federal, should be
neutral and detached, removed from politics.197 In fact, the first canon of
California’s Code of Judicial Ethics provides, “[a] judge shall uphold the
integrity and independence of the judiciary.”198 However, two facets of the law in
some states, both of which are present in California, seriously threaten the
impartiality of the judicial branch: the availability to the public of recall to take a
judge off the bench and the system of electing judges to the bench.199 Former Los
Angeles County Superior Court Judge Joyce Karlin said it well in her
controversial decision giving probation and no jail time to a woman convicted of
voluntary manslaughter: “[J]ustice is never served when public opinion,
prejudice, revenge or unwarranted sympathy are considered by a sentencing court
in resolving a case.”200 Unsurprisingly, Judge Karlin was the subject of an
ultimately unsuccessful recall campaign in response to that decision.201

195. Id.
196. Id.
197. See, e.g., Code of Conduct for United States Judges, UNITED STATES COURTS, http://www.
uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/code-conduct-united-states-judges#b (last visited Jan. 1, 2017) (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review) (“An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in
our society.”); CAL. COURTS, CALIFORNIA CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS 1 (2016), available at
http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/ca_code_judicial_ethics.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific
Law Review) (“A judge shall uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary. . ..[I]ndependence means a
judge’s freedom from influence or control other than as established by law.”).
198. CAL. COURTS, supra note 197, at 1.
199. Supra Parts III.B.1–2 (describing those issues).
200. People v. Du, No. BA037738 (Super. Ct. L.A. County, 1991) (available in JOSHUA DRESSLER &
STEPHEN P. GARVEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 54 (6th ed. 2012)).
201. Sheryl Stolberg, Candidate Karlin Lashes Out at Criticism Over Sentence, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 27,
1992), http://articles.latimes.com/1992-02-27/local/me-4249_1_suspended-sentence (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review).
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1. Judicial Recall202
California has seen several judicial recall attempts, including a few in recent
years that came close to gathering enough votes to get on the ballot.203 One recent
attempt from 2015 targeted Judge M. Marc Kelly of Orange County, who gave a
sentence below the statutory minimum, but within his discretion, out of
constitutionality concerns.204 Although that campaign ultimately failed, it still
gathered around 85,000 signatures—not an insignificant number.205 Currently,
Stanford law professor Michele Dauber, a family friend of the victim in People v.
Turner,206 is leading a campaign to recall Judge Persky for the six-month
sentence he gave Brock Turner.207 These campaigns gather much of their
momentum from social media; for example, the Persky recall campaign is very
active on Twitter208 and Facebook.209 Further, many online articles tend to take
the facts of high-profile cases like, People v. Turner, out of context and inflame
passions based on inaccurate reports, where many of the people becoming
inflamed by such misinformation are the same people who will end up voting on
reactive ballot initiatives or judicial recalls.210 One law professor at the
University of San Diego said that the complex issues that actually go into judicial
deliberations are “too cerebral for Facebook,” and that he “hopes voters
understand what’s at stake,” not only in the Persky campaign, but with any

202. See supra Part II.D (explaining the law of recall in California).
203. Recall History in California, CAL. SECRETARY ST., http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ recalls/recallhistory-california-1913-present/ (last visited Jan. 1, 2017) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review).
204. Orange County Judge M. Marc Kelly: Recall Effort is an Injustice, L.A. TIMES (May 19, 2015, 5:00
AM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-orange-county-judge-recall-campaign-20150519-story.html
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
205. Hager, supra note 130; Orange County Judge M. Marc Kelly: Recall Effort is an Injustice, supra
note 204.
206. Katy Murphy, Stanford Professor Michele Dauber Leads Effort to Recall Judge, SANTA CRUZ
SENTINEL (June 9, 2016, 7:31 PM), http://www.santacruzsentinel.com/article/NE/20160609/NEWS/160609736
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
207. Recall Judge Aaron Persky, supra note 11.
208. Recall Persky (@RecallPersky), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/recallpersky (last visited Dec. 29,
2016) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
209. Recall
Aaron
Persky
(@recallaaronpersky),
FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/
recallaaronpersky/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2016) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
210. See, e.g., Bradford Richardson, Social Media Turns Stanford Sexual Assault Victim’s ‘Tiny Fire’
Into a Blaze of Fury, WASH. TIMES (June 7, 2016), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/jun/7/ brockturners-rape-victim-ignites-social-media-fur/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review)
(emphasizing that the statutory maximum sentence for Turner’s crime was fourteen years in prison, without
giving any information on the statutory minimum or what factors go into a judge’s discretionary determination);
Elias Leight, Brock Turner to be Free After Three Months for ‘Good Behavior,’ ROLLING STONE (Aug. 30,
2016),
http://www.rollingstone.com/culture/news/brock-turner-to-be-released-from-jail-for-good-behaviorw436997 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (same). See also Grow, supra note 4 (referring
to Turner as a “rapist,” when in fact he was not actually convicted of rape but rather of a form of sexual
assault); Volpenhein, supra note 4 (same).
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attempt at judicial recall.211 Snippets and sound bytes on Facebook and other
social media sites cannot adequately educate the general population about
complex issues that take a law school education and decades of experience to
fully understand.212 Judges must carefully balance different and often conflicting
purposes of punishment when deciding individual sentences.213 They are also in a
unique position that can never be replicated; for example, the judge sees
witnesses first-hand to determine their credibility, and sees the defendant, often
interacting with him or her personally, and can determine the sincerity of any
statement the defendant makes at sentencing.214 An article on Facebook cannot
give the average reader the full picture of what went into a judge’s decision.215
These articles describing the case are not the only misleading information
surrounding People v. Turner—the campaign to recall Judge Persky has
contributed to the misinformation as well.216 The campaign website lists a few
cases that Judge Persky decided around the same time as People v. Turner in
attempt to show that he is biased in favor of college athletes like Turner.217
However, the campaign generally fails to describe important differences between
Turner and other defendants it compares him to; for example, the campaign uses
People v. Ramirez to argue that Judge Persky gave a supposedly similar offender
a longer sentence because he is a minority.218 What the campaign does not
describe are the numerous legally significant differences between Ramirez and
Turner—Ramirez was 32 and Turner 20 years old at the time of sentencing, and
Turner was intoxicated during commission of the crime, while Ramirez was
not.219 Youth and intoxication are legally relevant mitigating factors that Turner’s

211. Katherine Seligman, Judging the Judges: Recall May Become Easier, But Is That Better?,
CALMATTERS (Aug. 25, 2016), https://calmatters.org/articles/judging-the-judges-recalls-may-become-easierbut-is-that-better/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
212. Id.; Robinson, Cahill & Mohammad, supra note 118, at 2.
213. CAL. R. CT. 4.410(a) (2017).
214. John L. Kane, Judging Credibility, 33 LITIGATION 31, 31 (2007).
215. Seligman, supra note 211.
216. Infra Part III.B.1.
217. Response to the Commission on Judicial Performance, RECALL JUDGE AARON PERSKY,
http://www.recallaaronpersky.com/response_to_the_commission_on_judicial_performance (last visited Feb. 7,
2017) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
218. Id.; Harry Cockburn, Judge Who Sentenced Stanford Rape Case’s Brock Turner to Six Months Gives
Latino Man Three Years for Similar Crime, INDEP. (June 30, 2016), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/
americas/stanford-rape-case-judge-aaron-persky-brock-turner-latino-man-sentence-a7110586.html (on file with
The University of the Pacific Law Review).
219. Jason Silverstein, Brock Turner Judge Gives Harsher Sentence to an Immigrant, N.Y. DAILY NEWS
(June 27, 2016, 10:05 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/brock-turner-judge-harsher-sentenceimmigrant-article-1.2689471 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); Probation Report at 11–
12, People v. Turner, No. B1577162 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2016), available at https://assets.documentcloud.org/
documents/2858997/Probation-officer-s-report-in-Brock-Turner-case.pdf (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review).
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probation officer included in her report recommending the light sentence.220
Further, the two defendants were convicted of different crimes: Ramirez pled
guilty to sexual penetration by force, for which Judge Persky gave him the
minimum statutory sentence of three years, while Turner never pled guilty and
went to trial on different charges altogether.221
Social media and the availability of recall, as a reaction to unpopular but
lawful sentences, is a volatile combination that poses a serious threat to the
impartiality of the judicial branch.222 Most scholars and commentators agree that
judicial recall should be a backup measure used in cases of actual judicial
malfeasance, not mere public dissatisfaction with a lawful sentence.223 If the
campaign to recall Judge Persky is successful, the public might begin to see
judicial recall campaigns as an appropriate and effective solution to whatever
criminal case they are dissatisfied with.224 While this Comment does not
necessarily propose a change to the structure of California’s judicial branch, this
active threat to judicial impartiality further highlights the necessity of insulating
the criminal justice system from public reaction wherever possible.225
A judicial recall campaign, like the one to recall Judge Persky, is ideal fodder
for groups like the California Correctional Peace Officers Association
(“CCPOA”) who have a vested interest in keeping the prison population high.226
The CCPOA is California’s state prison guard union.227 The union has put large
amounts of money into California’s “tough on crime” movement, including over
$100,000 behind the Three Strikes Law in 1994, making it the second-largest
contributor to that initiative.228 The CCPOA has been behind several more “tough
on crime” efforts: it has provided over $120,000 to victims’ rights groups; spent

220. Probation Report at 11–12, People v. Turner, No. B1577162 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2016), available at
https://assets. documentcloud.org/documents/2858997/Probation-officer-s-report-in-Brock-Turner-case.pdf (on
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
221. Silverstein, supra note 219; Cockburn, supra note 218.
222. Seligman, supra note 211 (predicting that “growing mistrust in the justice system and the rise of
social media” could lead to more frequent judicial recalls).
223. Meares, supra note 122 (“[P]oliticized judging undermines the legitimacy of the criminal justice
system. . . . . If we want to have an independent judiciary we must stop electing it.”); Orange County Judge M.
Marc Kelly: Recall Effort is an Injustice, supra note 204 (“The essence of the American justice system is that
rulings are made by judges who are shielded from the heat of public emotion and pressure of politics. . . .
Convicted criminals are not sentenced by mob decision.”).
224. Seligman, supra note 211.
225. See supra Part II.B–D (describing the various ways in which California’s criminal justice system is
particularly susceptible to impulsive reactions in public sentiment).
226. Tim Kowal, The Role of the Prison Guards Union in California’s Troubled Prison System, UNION
WATCH (June 15, 2011), http://unionwatch.org/the-role-of-the-prison-guards-union-in-californias-troubledprison-system/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
227. CCPOA–About Us, CAL. CORRECTIONAL PEACE OFFICERS ASS’N, https://www.ccpoa.org/about-us/
(last visited Feb. 5, 2017) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
228. Ray Downs, Corporations Are Cashing in on California’s Prison Overcrowding Crisis, VICE (Oct.
3, 2013, 6:00 AM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/corporations-are-cashing-in-on-californias-prisonovercrowding-crisis (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
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over one million dollars in opposition to Proposition 66, which would have
restricted the scope of Three Strikes if it had passed in 2004; gave over $75,000
to opponents of Proposition 36, which ultimately was successful despite
CCPOA’s efforts and passed in 2000, increasing offenders’ substance abuse
treatment opportunities; and successfully opposed Governor Schwarzenegger’s
rehabilitation-focused method of reducing the state’s prison population.229 The
CCPOA is of course doing so to benefit its members, whose jobs “depend on
prisons being open for business . . . . More prisoners lead to more prisons.”230 As
discussed throughout this Comment, sentence enhancements and other “tough on
crime” legislation is often borne from the combination of misinformation, public
overreaction to isolated incidents of crime, and politicians’ ability to capitalize on
that sentiment to pass new laws.231 The CCPOA has already supported many of
California’s “tough on crime” laws, notably Three Strikes.232 Whether the
CCPOA ends up contributing to the campaign to recall Judge Persky, or has
already done so, the perceived availability of such a measure as a solution to
public dissatisfaction with a lawful sentence is an ideal time for such an
organization to take advantage of public sentiment and support an opportunity for
more “tough on crime” legislation to ultimately secure more jobs for its
members.233
2. Judicial Elections
As mentioned above, this Comment does not go so far as to recommend
states stop electing judges in favor of appointing them, as is done in the federal
system.234 Rather, in this section, this Comment analyzes current issues with the
electoral system235 and later describes how the MPC Sentencing revisions could
help alleviate those problems in California.236
The recent Brennan Center study, noted above,237 details the effect that
elections have on judges presiding over criminal cases.238 The paper summarized
several studies done on the interplay between judicial decision-making and
judicial elections.239 It found that elected trial judges tend to give more punitive
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Supra Part III (examining these conditions and how they give rise to overly punitive legislation).
232. Id.
233. Id.; see supra Part III (detailing how many “tough on crime” laws arise from these societal
situations).
234. ZIMRING, HAWKINS & KAMIN, supra note 19, at 182–87.
235. Infra Part III.B.2 (describing issues with electing judges).
236. Infra Part IV (analyzing how the Model Penal Code Sentencing revisions would help California).
237. Supra Part II.B (mentioning the Brennan Center study and its findings on judicial impartiality).
238. BERRY, supra note 20.
239. Id. at 7.
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sentences and appellate judges tend to vote to uphold capital sentences more
frequently the closer they are to a retention election.240 These increases are not
warranted by any need to protect the public from the offenders.241 The authors of
one of the individual studies included in the Brennan Center report stated, “[a]ll
judges, even the most punitive, increase their sentences as re-election nears.”242
Such an influence on sentencing decisions is a threat to the integrity of the
criminal justice system—should it be relevant to an individual defendant’s rights
whether the decision will look good in the judge’s next campaign or put the judge
at risk for a “soft on crime” attack ad?243
This finding goes hand-in-hand with the actual campaigns judges run during
elections.244 Television ads are a popular medium for candidates to connect with
voters, and many of them attack the competition.245 Unsurprisingly, “tough on
crime” is an ever-popular platform, as is vilifying opponents for being “soft on
crime.”246 Negative attack ads tend to choose a few particularly “incendiary
issues” from the judge’s past rulings, and portray those decisions in such a way
to give viewers the impression that the judge is on the criminal’s side.247 These
ads give no context to the case, such as any mitigating factors that would have
called for a lesser sentence or anywhere close to the whole factual story.248
Rather, similar to many of the recent articles on People v. Turner discussed
above,249 these ads give an extremely brief, misleading characterization designed
to appeal to viewers’ most basal emotions.250 For example, one television ad in
an Illinois Supreme Court race told viewers that the judge in question “gave easy
bail to a woman later found guilty of murdering her 4-year-old stepson,” a claim
that in reality tells the viewer virtually nothing about the judge’s ability to serve
on the bench or even the propriety of his decision in the case.251 A judge’s past
criminal defense work is another area attacked by opposing candidates.252 One ad
attacking judicial candidate Bridget McCormack for her past criminal defense
work circulated during the 2012 Michigan Supreme Court election cycle.253 The

240. Id. at 7, 9–10.
241. Vitiello Judicial Activism, supra note 159, at 1069–70.
242. Adam Liptak, Judges Who Are Elected Like Politicians Tend to Act Like Them, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3,
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/04/us/politics/judges-election-john-roberts.html (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review).
243. Supra Part III.B.2; infra Part III.B.2.
244. BERRY, supra note 20, at 3–6.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 3.
248. Id. at 3–4.
249. Infra Part I (giving examples of articles discussing the case).
250. BERRY, supra note 20, at 3–4.
251. Id. at 4.
252. Id. at 4–5.
253. Id.
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ad featured the mother of a soldier who had been killed in Afghanistan saying,
“[M]y son’s a hero and fought to protect us. Bridget McCormack volunteered to
help free a terrorist … [H]ow could you?”254
One former justice of the Mississippi Supreme Court stated, “[j]udges who
are running for reelection do keep in mind what the next 30-second ad is going to
look like.”255 It should come as no surprise, then, that judges’ sentencing
decisions can be influenced by upcoming elections, either consciously or
subconsciously.256 If these inaccurate ads are the main way by which voters make
their decisions, and if judges want to acquire and maintain their seats on the
bench, they would be hard-pressed to not have at least a fleeting thought about
how their decisions in particularly contentious cases might come back to haunt
them come election season.257
IV. THE MODEL PENAL CODE SENTENCING REVISIONS AND WHY CALIFORNIA
NEEDS THEM
California remains one of the “few hinterland states . . . that seem to live in a
parallel universe untouched by the [Model Penal] Code.”258 Its sentencing
provisions are no exception.259 This section first summarizes the major changes
in the 2017 Model Penal Code Sentencing (“MPCS”) provisions and examines
sentencing commission models the ALI considered from around the country—
both as what to emulate and what to avoid.260 Next, it analyzes how California
might have fared differently under the circumstances that gave rise to legislation
like Three Strikes and Chapters 848 and 863 if the state had the MPCS provisions
in place.261 Finally, this Comment speculates as to potential issues the state might
face if it does adopt the MPCS provisions.262
A. The revised Model Penal Code Sentencing provisions
The revision of the MPCS is the ALI’s “most senior ongoing project.”263
Most relevant for this Comment are the revisions of sections 1.02(2) and 7.09,
254. Id.
255. Id. at 7.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Joshua Dressler, The Model Penal Code: Is It Like a Classic Movie in Need of a Remake?, 1 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 157, 157 (2003).
259. Id.
260. Infra Part IV.A (summarizing the 2017 Model Penal Code Sentencing revisions).
261. Infra Part IV.B (applying the provisions to California’s history of reactive legislation).
262. Infra Part IV.C (describing potential issues that the state might face in adopting the Model Penal
Code Sentencing provisions).
263. MPCS, supra note 25.
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laying out the purposes of sentencing and the scope of appellate review,
respectively, and articles 6 and 7, establishing a sentencing commission and
providing guidelines for it to work within.264
1. Section 1.02(2)—Purposes of Sentencing
In this section, the revised MPCS provisions establish two punishment tiers:
those that must be followed, and those that must be followed when “reasonably
feasible.”265 In every individual sentencing decision, “all official actors in the
sentencing system” must “render sentences . . . within a range of severity
proportionate to the gravity of offenses, the harms done to crime victims, and the
blameworthiness of offenders.”266 Next, whenever “reasonably feasible,” these
actors must attempt to “achieve offender rehabilitation, general deterrence,
incapacitation of dangerous offenders, restitution to crime victims, preservation
of families, and reintegration of offenders into the law-abiding community,” so
long as these goals can be achieved within the boundaries enunciated in the
previous mandatory section.267 Finally, the third subsection is particularly
relevant in light of California’s issues discussed above: sentences must be “no
more severe than necessary to achieve the applicable purposes” in the first two
subsections.268 This section further provides that in the administration of the
state’s sentencing system, one of the primary purposes is to “preserve judicial
discretion to individualize sentences within a framework of law.”269
Already, this first section addresses many of the problems described earlier
in this Comment.270 One of the main issues with short-sighted, reactive
legislation imposing mandatory minimum sentences is that the bar for sentencing
is set by the “worst case scenario” crime, and all offenders are punished as if they
had committed that worst case scenario crime.271 Such unjustified mandatory
minimums have no place in an MPC-based sentencing system, particularly in
conjunction with the provision that the overall administrative structure of the
sentencing system “preserve judicial discretion to individualize sentences within
a framework of law.”272 The commentary following proposed MPCS section
1.02(2) provides that the revisions “incorporate[] meaningful proportionality
limitations,” such that “no crime-reductive or other utilitarian purpose of
sentencing may justify a punishment outside the ‘range of severity’

264.
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266.
267.
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269.
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Id. §§ 1.02(2), 7.09, arts. 6, 7 (including those sections).
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proportionate” to the three goals enunciated in section 1.02(2)(a)(i).273 The
commentary also addresses the issue of public resource preservation by avoiding
unnecessarily long sentences: The principle “that sentences should be ‘no more
severe than necessary’ to serve their authorized purposes . . . guards against the
needless expenditure of correctional resources.”274
2. Section 7.09—Scope of Appellate Review
The MPC’s focus on proportionality does not end with the trial court, but
remains central to appellate review as well.275 Section 7.09(1) specifies that the
appellate court must work within the purposes of punishment laid out in section
1.02(2), one of which is to “render sentences . . . within a range of severity
proportionate to the gravity of offenses,”276 and to further the goal of preserving
“substantial judicial discretion to individualize sentences within a framework of
law.”277 This section also establishes an important foundation for proportionality
review.278 The appellate court is allowed to engage in “subconstitutional”
proportionality review to address sentences that would not reach the extremely
high threshold required to violate the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause, but are nonetheless unjustifiably severe.279 This section
provides that the appellate court may modify any sentence in any way—even if the
trial court imposed the sentence as required by a mandatory minimum statute—if
the appellate court finds it “disproportionately severe.”280 Further, the appellate
court is to “use its independent judgment” in subconstitutional proportionality
review.281 This section ensures that proportionality in sentencing is furthered
beyond the trial court into appellate review, and importantly gives appellate courts
the grounds to review sentences for subconstitutional disproportionality.282
3. The Structure of the Sentencing Commission
The MPCS provisions establishing a sentencing commission are nuanced.283
Regarding the commission’s membership, the MPCS requires judges of each
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level of state court to be a part of the body, as well as an equal number of
prosecutors and defense attorneys, a chief of police, an academic “with
experience in criminal-justice research,” and members of the public, one being “a
victim of a crime defined as a felony, and one of whom shall be a rehabilitated
ex-inmate of a prison in the state.”284 Clearly, the ALI intends for sentencing
commissions created under the guide of the MPC to consist of a well-rounded
body able to intelligently discuss issues in criminal justice.285 Presumably, such a
commission would be more likely to promulgate well-nuanced laws with less
political influence than the legislature.286 Importantly, none of the members are
elected to the commission, but rather are appointed— the judges appointed by the
chief justice of the state supreme court, and the others appointed by the state
governor.287 This further insulates the guideline-establishing process from public
sentiment.288
In its first few years of existence, the commission is charged with several
tasks, including researching the state’s current sentencing and measuring its
effectiveness against the purposes of punishment laid out in section 1.02(2).289
Further, the MPC provides the commission with “ongoing responsibilities”
intended to heighten accountability and transparency, as well as to ensure that all
sentences remain justified: among other duties, the commission must regularly
revise sentencing guidelines as necessary and develop programs to track criminal
cases to watch for discriminatory effects and other issues.290 The commission
would also be responsible for informing the legislature and the public about the
impact existing and proposed legislation has on state resources.291
The structure of the MPC-designed sentencing commission addresses several
issues California struggles with today.292 The commission’s diverse makeup, as
well as appointing rather than electing members, helps ensure that the guidelines
will be well-balanced, and be impervious to the influence of special interests or
political parties.293 Legislators’ political deference to the public’s reaction to the
crime of the month, as well as funds from special interests both in the legislature
and with ballot initiatives, are responsible for much of the overly punitive and
complex legislation California struggles with today.294 The sentencing
commission provides the sentencing system with more political insulation than
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does California’s current system.295 Further, because the commission is charged
with checking its guidelines against the purposes of punishment outlined in MPC
section 1.02(2), it would ideally not come up with the next Three Strikes Law
that scholars call “a choice made in a vacuum” with no articulable penological
philosophy.296
4. The Sentencing Guidelines Promulgated by the Commission
The ALI decided that the sentencing commission should promulgate
presumptive, rather than advisory, guidelines: “Presumptive-guidelines systems,
where provision has been made for appellate sentence review, have generally
succeeded in promoting this longstanding law-reform goal [of meaningful
appellate review of the substance of sentencing decisions].”297 This insulates
judicial discretion within the guidelines; if the guidelines are presumptive and
their application is not optional to the judge, a sentence properly within those
guidelines does not merit public backlash.298 Importantly, the ALI emphasizes
that the commission must base these guidelines on its “collective judgment for
ordinary cases of the kind governed by each presumptive sentence.”299 This
provision directly addresses the “worst-case scenario” problem by ensuring that
the presumptive guidelines are based on the “ordinary case,” not the particularly
tragic one garnering the most media attention.300 Finally, one provision is the
antithesis of unjustified mandatory minimum legislation: “The guidelines should
invite sentencing courts to individualize sentencing decisions in light of the
purposes in section 1.02(2)(a), and the guidelines may not foreclose the
individualization of sentences in light of those considerations.”301 The ALI was
sure to be as explicit as possible to that point, providing in the same section that
guidelines the commission promulgates “shall not reflect or incorporate the terms
of statutory mandatory-penalty provisions.”302
The MPCS provisions also detail what factors the commission should
consider, or allow the judge to consider, in handing down sentences.303 The
commission has flexibility to consider any factor relevant to the section 1.02(2)
purposes of punishment.304 Notably, the section provides for consideration of
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individual offender characteristics but “only as grounds to reduce the severity of
sentences that would otherwise be recommended,” when they indicate
“circumstances of hardship, deprivation, vulnerability, or handicap.”305
In contrast, the MPCS provisions are stacked against considering criminal
history.306 “It is well established in criminology that criminal record is a useful
predictor of future criminality, perhaps the most powerful of all variables, but is
not as good as actuarial, multi-factor risk-assessment instruments that incorporate
criminal history along with other predictive factors.”307 Section 6B.07 provides
that a sentencing commission must “explain and justify any use of criminal
history” within the purposes of punishment enumerated in section 1.02(2).308
Overall, section 6B.07 discourages against any use of criminal history, requiring
the commission to keep in mind “offenders have already been punished for their
prior convictions,” and that “the use of criminal history by itself may overpredict” an offender’s risk of recidivism, and finally that the use of criminal
history provisions in general may have discriminatory effects on disadvantaged
groups.309 The commentary to this section notes that criminal history can be
useful in determining a proper sentence, but only when it accompanies other
predictive factors in a “well-constructed” risk-assessment tool.310 In fact, the
report cites Virginia’s Criminal Sentencing Commission as an example – using
multi-factor tests that the commission identifies as low-risk offenders who could
be safely “diverted from incarceration.”311 These totaled about half of the
nonviolent offender population.312
Finally, the MPCS provisions preserve judicial discretion.313 Although the
commission’s guidelines have presumptive force of law, the sentencing judge
may depart from them “on the existence of one or more aggravating or mitigating
factors enumerated in the guidelines or other factors grounded in the purposes of
§ 1.02(2)(a), provided the factors take the case outside the realm of an ordinary
case.”314 The MPCS also provides a solution for one issue contributing to
California’s prison overcrowding: geriatric prisoners who pose no threat to
society.315 “An offender under any imprisonment sentence shall be eligible for
judicial modification of sentence in circumstances of the prisoner’s advanced
age, physical or mental infirmity . . . or other compelling reasons warranting

305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.

Id. § 6B.06(4)(a).
Id. § 6B.06(2)(b).
Id. § 6B.07 cmt. at 375.
Id. § 6B.07(1).
Id. § 6B.07(1)(a)-(c).
Id. § 6B.07 cmt. at 368.
Id. § 6B.07 cmt. at 375.
Id. § 6B.07 cmt. at 375.
Id. § 6B.03(4).
Id. § 7.XX(2)(a).
Id. § 305.7(1); Vitiello Judicial Activism, supra note 159, at 1069–70.
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modification of sentence.”316 The MPCS then outlines the procedures for such a
modification.317
5. Other Sentencing Commission Models
The ALI based the MPC sentencing commission structure not merely on
conjecture, but rather on several successful models from throughout the
country.318 One area of influence is the MPC commission’s focus on
proportionality, among other purposes of punishment.319 The ALI cited
successful state sentencing commissions that similarly focus on proportionality;
for example, Minnesota’s guidelines provide, “[t]he purpose of the Sentencing
Guidelines is to . . . ensure that the sanctions imposed for felony convictions are
proportional to the severity of the conviction offense and the offender’s criminal
history.”320 Virginia’s guidelines are similar—the statutory purpose of its
sentencing commission is in part to “achieve the goals of certainty, consistency,
and adequacy of punishment with due regard to the seriousness of the offense,
[and] the dangerousness of the offender. . . .”321 In recognizing the importance of
setting guidelines based on ordinary cases, rather than the “worst-case scenario”
situation, the ALI acknowledged states that have implemented that policy.322
Kansas is one of these states, and its guidelines are intended to “establish equity
among like offenders in typical case scenarios.”323 In short, the theoretical
underpinnings of the MPC sentencing commission are modeled after successful
sentencing commissions throughout the country.324
The ALI also adopted resource management tools of successful sentencing
commissions.325 It looked to sentencing commissions whose prison growth rates
over several years were slower than the national average, including Minnesota,
North Carolina, and Virginia.326 The ALI found that one “important tool” utilized
in these states is the “correctional-population forecasting model,” and thus
316. MPCS, supra note 25, § 305.7(1).
317. Id. § 305.7.
318. Id.§ 1.02(2) cmt. at 19–20.
319. Id. § 1.02(2)(2)(a)(i).
320. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND COMMENTARY § 1(A) (MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
COMM’N 2016), available at http://mn.gov/msgc-stat/documents/2016%20Guidelines/11_17_2016_Update
_August2016_Guidelines.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
321. VA. CODE. ANN. § 17.1-801 (West 2017).
322. MPCS, supra note 25, § 6B.03(2); id. § 1.02(2) cmt. at 25.
323. KANSAS SENTENCING GUIDELINES DESK REFERENCE MANUAL 31 (KAN. SENTENCING COMM’N
2015), available at https://sentencing.ks.gov/docs/default-source/2015-DRM/2015-desk-reference-manual(text-only).pdf?sfvrsn=0 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
324. Supra Part VI.A.4 (discussing sentencing philosophies of states the ALI looked to in designing the
MPC sentencing commission).
325. MPCS, supra note 25, § 1.02(2) cmt. at 16.
326. Id. § 1.02(2) cmt. at 16.
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incorporated that tool into section 6A.07 of the new MPCS.327 Generally, having
a sentencing commission promulgating effective guidelines and actively
reviewing the state’s criminal justice system tends to reduce or stop prison
population growth trends in these states.328 The ALI incorporated this process of
review and analysis by requiring that the MPC commission periodically analyze
the effectiveness of its sentencing guidelines against the enumerated purposes of
punishment and compare its data to other jurisdictions.329
Victim restitution is another area where the influence of other sentencing
commissions is apparent in the MPCS provisions.330 Restitution is an explicit
purpose for the MPC sentencing commission, but is only to be pursued “when
reasonably feasible,” so as not to entirely drain a defendant of his resources and
prevent him from effectively reentering society.331 In its commentary, the ALI
listed several states that consider the offender’s financial circumstances when
deciding whether an order to pay restitution is appropriate, including
Minnesota332 and Massachusetts.333
The ALI was similarly cognizant of less successful sentencing commission
models and made deliberate choices to not incorporate those into the MPC
revisions.334 For example, MPCS considers a victim “any person who has
suffered physical, emotional, or financial harm as the direct result of the
commission of a criminal offense.”335 In contrast, the United States Sentencing
Guidelines allow “victim” to be interpreted as broadly as an entire community,
even if only a few were actually harmed by the individual’s crime.336 Given the
MPC’s focus on proportionality, the ALI rejected that “broad and amorphous
conception of victims entitled to restitution as part of the criminal sentence.”337
California also has an extensive listing of who or what may be considered a
victim for purposes of restitution: a corporation, a person living in the same
house as the actual victim, family members of the actual victim, and
governmental entities tasked with restoring property the individual defaced.338

327. Id.; id. § 6A.07.
328. Id. § 1.02(2) cmt. at 37–38.
329. Id. § 6A.04(3)(a).
330. Id. § 6.04A cmt. at 62–63.
331. Id. § 1.02(2)(2)(a)(ii).
332. MINN. STAT. § 611A.045(1)(a)(2) (2017) “[I]n determining whether to order restitution and the
amount of the restitution, [the court] shall consider the following factors. . .(2) the income, resources, and
obligations of the defendant.”).
333. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, § 92A (“In so determining, the court shall consider the financial
resources of the defendant and the burden restitution will impose on the defendant. The defendant’s present and
future ability to make such restitution shall be considered.”).
334. MPCS, supra note 25, art. 6 cmt. at 106.
335. Id. § 6.04A(3).
336. 18 U.S.C. § 3663(c)(2)(A); MPCS, supra note 25, art. 6 cmt. at 106.
337. MPCS, supra note 25, art. 6 cmt. at 106.
338. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1202.4(k) (West 2017).
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For similar reasons, the ALI rejected California’s elaborate listing.339 The ALI
also rejected California’s approach to restitution—as described below, California
not only requires that the court order full restitution, but also expressly proscribes
consideration of the defendant’s financial situation when deciding whether to
order restitution and determining the restitution amount.340
B. How Might an MPC California Have Dealt with Polly Klaas’ Murder or
Brock Turner’s Sentence?
As described above, the kidnapping and murder of twelve-year-old Polly
Klaas provided the momentum for the enactment of the Three Strikes Law, and
public outrage over Brock Turner’s relatively short sentence inspired two bills
and a judicial recall campaign.341Three Strikes has proven problematic in
California for many reasons, including its lack of a focused penological
purpose—the only conceivable justifications are incapacitation and deterrence,
but as previously discussed, even those fade away in light of the excessive social
cost of imprisoning offenders far longer than necessary.342 An MPC-designed
sentencing commission, had it been in place at the time, would have helped
California in at least two distinct ways: the commission’s sheer existence would
have provided more of a buffer from public sentiment and politics that provided
the impetus for such a far-reaching legislation;343 and the requirement that the
commission promulgate all of its guidelines within the clear penological purposes
laid out in section 1.02(2) of the MPC would have reigned in Three Strikes’
excesses and ensured a more justifiable law.344 Further, the commission’s
presumption against considering criminal history would have lessened much of
the severity of the focus on recidivism in the Three Strikes Law.345
The sentencing commission would have provided much of the same
protection to California’s sentencing system in the wake of public outrage over
People v. Turner.346 Rather than swiftly adopting two bills that effectively
impose a three-year mandatory minimum prison term and strip the sentencing
judge’s discretion,347 the commission would have neutrally, and intelligently,
339.
340.
341.
342.

MPCS, supra note 25, art. 6 cmt. at 107.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1202.4(g) (West 2017).
Supra Part III.A (summarizing instances of reactive legislation in California).
ZIMRING, HAWKINS & KAMIN, supra note 19, at 215; Vitiello Three Strikes, supra note 88, at 437–

40.
343. ZIMRING, HAWKINS & KAMIN, supra note 19, at 182–87.
344. MPCS, supra note 25, §§ 1.02(2)(a), 6A.04(3)(a).
345. See id. § 6B.07(1)(a)–(c) (“The commission shall explain and justify any use of criminal history in
the guidelines with reference to the purposes in § 1.02(2)”).
346. ZIMRING, HAWKINS & KAMIN, supra note 19, at 182–87.
347. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 263.1 (enacted by 2016 Cal. Stat. Ch. 848), 1203.065 (amended by 2016 Cal.
Stat. Ch. 863); see also id. § 264(a) (providing that the minimum sentence for a rape conviction is three years
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discussed the existence of any potential “loopholes” and whether any need exists
for additional legislation.348 In short, an MPC sentencing commission would have
forced California to legislate with its brain, not with its emotions.349
C. Potential Issues California Might Face In Adopting the MPCS Provisions
Aside from resistance to the magnitude of adopting a new sentencing system,
one argument that opponents could make against adopting the MPCS revisions is
that doing so will override many of the victims’ rights protections that California
currently has in place.350 California’s state constitution includes a Victim’s Bill of
Rights, which in part provides that victims have an unequivocal right to
restitution whenever the victim “suffers a loss”—this right is not affected by the
“sentence or disposition imposed.”351 Because the MPC requires that “decisions
affecting the sentencing of individual offenders” and “all matters affecting the
administration of the sentencing system” be carried out within its three
enumerated purposes of punishment, no one goal can take unbridled precedence
over the others.352 However, in response to this argument, the MPCS does
provide for specific consideration of restitution as a goal of sentencing.353 The
MPCS’ secondary tier of punishments explains one of its purposes: “When
reasonably feasible, to achieve . . . restitution to crime victims . . . provided these
goals are pursued within the boundaries of proportionality in [section
1.02(2)(a)(i)].”354 Therefore, victims would not go unprotected if California
adopted the MPCS provisions; rather, their rights would still be upheld and
restitution considered an important goal of punishment; it would just be within a
proportional sentencing structure for the betterment of society as a whole.355
V. CONCLUSION
California faces two serious problems threatening the integrity of its criminal
justice system: precipitous legislation with no clear penological purpose, and a
judicial system that provides little protection for judges to exercise the discretion

imprisonment).
348. See MPCS, supra note 25, § 6A.02 (laying out the makeup of the commission and its deliberations).
349. Supra Parts I–III (describing how reactive legislation got California the overly complex penal code
that now plagues its criminal justice system).
350. Compare CAL. CONST. art. I § 28(b)(13) (providing an absolute right to restitution to victims who
have suffered a loss) and MPCS, supra note 25, § 1.02(2) (requiring that all individual sentencing decisions be
made in light of the enumerated purposes of punishment).
351. Id.
352. MPCS, supra note 25, § 1.02(2).
353. Id. § 1.02(2)(2)(a)(ii).
354. Id.
355. Id.
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necessary to hand down fair and just sentences.356 It is fine that legislators listen
to current public sentiment, but capitalizing on public outrage over the crime of
the month to quickly pass sentence enhancements does nothing to further the
state’s criminal justice system.357 Rather, it erodes the justifications that must be
constantly upheld if we are to have a respectable criminal justice system.358
Further, California not only elects its judges to the bench, but also allows its
residents to initiate recall campaigns for literally any reason; the state
constitution actually proscribes any review of the merits of a recall petition.359
Judges—the actors in the American legal system we depend on to be
independent, neutral arbiters of the law—are politically vulnerable in
California.360 California’s recall system goes far beyond any plausible need for
judicial accountability, enough of which is already provided in the normal
election process.361 Combined with a legislative system untied to any coherent
penological philosophy, the judicial vulnerability to public sentiment is a
dangerous threat to our criminal justice system.362
California’s problems are real, beyond the four corners of this Comment.363
The problems are so real, in fact, that the federal courts, including the United
States Supreme Court, have gotten involved.364 The state is currently under a
2009 federal court order to reduce its prison population to 137.5% of its design
capacity; however, as of February 2014, the population remained at 144%
capacity.365 The Supreme Court upheld this order,366 and the District Court for
the Eastern District of California continues to demand a “‘durable’ solution to
California prison overcrowding.”367 With this pressure, California may finally

356. Supra Part III (describing those two issues in detail).
357. Supra Part III.A (discussing issues with reactive legislation).
358. Supra Part III.A (discussing issues with reactive legislation).
359. Procedure for Recalling State and Local Officials, supra note 125.
360. Hager, supra note 130.
361. See generally Wiemond Wu, Comment, Tackling the Crocodile from the Judge’s Bathtub: Why
“Unregulated” Judicial Recall Should End in California in Light of People v. Turner, 49 U. PAC. L. REV. 699
(2018) (explaining that the system of electing judges already provides enough accountability, and that this
argument does not justify unchecked judicial recall).
362. Supra Part III.B (describing current threats to judicial impartiality in California).
363. Supra Part III (analyzing the problems in California’s criminal justice system).
364. Coleman v. Brown, No. 2:90-cv-0520 LKK DAD (PC), 2014 WL 2889598 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 10,
2014), available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/News/docs/3jp-Feb-2014/Three-Judge-Court-opinion-2-20-2014.pdf
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011).
365. Id.
366. Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011).
367. Coleman v. Brown, No. 2:90-cv-0520 LKK DAD (PC), at *2, 2014 WL 2889598 (E.D. Cal. Feb.
10, 2014), available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/News/docs/3jp-Feb-2014/Three-Judge-Court-opinion-2-202014.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
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“be open to adoption of a sentencing commission as part of long-term
reforms.”368
The 2017 Model Penal Code Sentencing revisions could be California’s fresh
start.369 The state must find a way to trust judges and their discretion, keep its
sentencing laws tied to justified purposes of punishment, and maintain
transparency through the process.370 The “tough on crime” movement may have
peaked in the 1990s, yet it is still an essential campaign platform and thus
remains a threat to the impartiality of the criminal justice system.371 A wellstructured sentencing commission modeled after the MPCS design would
insulate California’s criminal justice system from politics, prevent future
injustice, and help alleviate the problems that decades of “tough on crime”
legislation have created in the state.372

368. Michael Vitiello, Reforming California Sentencing Practice and Policy: Are We There Yet?, 46 U.
PAC. L. REV. 685, 729 (2014).
369. Supra Part IV (summarizing the MPCS provisions).
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